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Abstract.  There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a 
variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of 
the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative 
externalities upon each other.  This paper argues that these inefficiencies 
can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any public 
payment they would like to make.  These payments, so-called flexible entry 
fees, do not affect the allocation decision of the auctioneer.  We show that 
auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where 
bidders signal their type before the auction itself takes place. 
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1. Introduction 
A relatively recent literature has studied how post-auction interactions, such as resale or 
after-market competition, affect bidders’ bidding behavior in auctions.  One application 
that has received particular attention, both in the theoretical literature and in the popular 
press, are the auctions for third generation mobile telecommunication licenses around the 
world, which enable the winning bidders to compete with each other by offering 
telecommunication services to final consumers.2  There are now many papers studying 
this framework, and most of these papers emphasize that common auction properties do 
not hold in such an environment and that inefficient outcomes are likely to result. 
The literature the present paper builds on studies auctions with the presence of 
negative informational externalities due to after-market interactions (see Jehiel and 
Moldovanu, 2006, for an overview).  One application of this literature (see Goeree, 2003, 
Das Varma, 2003, and Moldovanu and Sela, 2003) is a single-unit auction where one 
object, namely a patent for a cost reduction, is auctioned and the winner competes in the 
market after the auction with all non-winners.  Moldovanu and Sela (2003) show that 
standard auctions lead to inefficient allocations when bidders’ values are strongly and 
negatively interdependent.3  The reason why efficient equilibria do not exist is that on the 
margin, due to the strong negative externality, the willingness to pay of a more efficient 
firm is lower than that of a less efficient firm. 
Goeree (2003) and Das Varma (2003) analyze a similar setting but allow for 
signaling private information through the auction bid.  The reason why an efficient 
equilibrium may not exist in these papers is that under strategic complementarity, a more 
efficient firm may want to understate its private information by shading its bid in order to 
relax after-market competition.  This phenomenon has been documented as a “fat cat” 
business strategy in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).  Das Varma (2003) shows that the 
inefficiency gradually disappears when the downstream market becomes perfectly 
competitive.  Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) analyze how different bid-
announcement policies affect the efficiency and revenue of an auction (see also Molnar 
                                                                          
2  For easily accessible theoretical articles on the main issues involved, see Binmore and Klemperer (2002), 
Börgers and Dustmann (2003), Klemperer (2002a), Klemperer (2002b), and Van Damme (2002).  For a 
popular press article, see Klemperer (2000). 
3  See also Jehiel et al. (1996) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) for related papers where an (informational) 
externality may lead to inefficiency in standard single-unit auctions. 
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and Virag, 2008).  In particular, Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) show that when 
signaling reduces the revenue and threatens the efficiency due to, e.g., strategic 
complementarity, auctioneers prefer auction formats that do not reveal the winning bid. 
Another instance of this literature studies auctioning of multiple objects.  Hoppe et 
al. (2006) concentrate on auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric such as in 
markets with incumbents and entrants.  The main insight in Hoppe et al. (2006) is that 
auctioning more licenses does not necessarily induce a higher degree of competitiveness, 
i.e., higher after-market efficiency.  Janssen and Karamychev (2009a) show that a 
negative externality (and associated with it potential allocative inefficiency) may appear 
when firms differ in their attitudes toward risk.  Janssen and Karamychev (2009b) show 
that when bidders’ types are ex-ante correlated, efficient equilibria may fail to exist even 
when the negative externality is weak.  The main reason for this is that the correlation and 
the externality are, to a certain degree, alternative ways to create conditions for the non-
existence of monotone equilibria. 
All these papers differ in many details, such as whether one or multiple objects are 
auctioned, whether bidders are ex-ante symmetric or asymmetric, whether market 
demand is certain or uncertain, whether risk attitude plays a role or does not, which 
auction format is used, etc.  In all these environments, efficient equilibria may fail to 
exist.  In the present paper, we study a general model that encompasses many of the 
environments studied in the literature.  We show that in all such environments an auction 
exists that possesses an efficient equilibrium.  In this particular auction, bidders are asked 
to pay any publicly observable sum of money they would like.  We call these voluntary 
payments “flexible entry fees”. 
The idea of a voluntary entry fee could be traced back to Maskin and Riley (1981).  
The voluntary entry fee in that paper, however, is very different from our flexible entry 
fee.  In Maskin and Riley (1981), the auctioneer sets a fixed (inflexible) entry fee and 
bidders can decide whether to pay that fee or not.  The object is then allocated to the 
highest bidder who has paid the entry fee, if any, and if no bidder has paid the entry fee 
the object is allocated to the highest bidder.  In our paper, bidders decide themselves on 
the amount of the entry fee they pay (flexibility), and the only thing the auctioneer does is 
that he collects and announces the entry fees individual bidders have paid.  Independent 
of the chosen entry fee, all bidders are allowed to participate in the auction. 
The flexible entry fee gives bidders a possibility to signal their type.  The incentive 
to reveal their types is exactly the reason why bidders may pay a positive entry fee.  
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Signaling types through bidding behavior during an auction is usually detrimental to the 
efficiency of the auction (see, e.g., Goeree, 2003, and Das Varma, 2003).  Signaling prior 
to the auction, however, turns out to have the opposite effect. 
The intuition is as follows.  First, note that due to negative interdependencies, firms’ 
values are negatively related to the types of other firms.  For example, if firms compete à 
la Bertrand or Cournot in an after-market and a firm’s type is its cost efficiency, a firm’s 
valuation for the license, i.e., its after-market profit, negatively depends on the types of 
the firm’s competitors.  This negative interdependency creates an incentive for a firm to 
signal its high efficiency level in order to scare off its competitors in the pre-auction 
signaling stage so that they bid lower in the auction.  The more efficient the firm is, the 
larger its incentive to signal, because a more efficient firm wins with a higher probability 
and, therefore, is willing to spend a larger part of its after-market profit on signaling its 
type through the entry fee.  Together with the fact that the after-market profit of this more 
efficient firm is higher, this implies that the more efficient firm sets a higher entry fee, 
and the equilibrium is perfectly separating.  As a result, all information that is relevant for 
taking the negative externality into account is revealed before the auction starts, and this 
information revelation makes the auction efficient.4 
In the main body of the paper, we show how this auction works in detail for a 
second-price sealed-bid auction where bidders’ valuations negatively depend on the types 
of the other bidders.  For a second-price sealed-bid auction with independently distributed 
types, we show that if the negative interdependencies are relatively weak, the auction 
with flexible entry fees is revenue-equivalent to and yields the same (efficient) allocation 
as the standard second-price sealed-bid auction.  If the negative interdependencies are 
relatively strong, the auction with flexible entry fees remains efficient whereas the 
standard second-price sealed-bid auction is known to be inefficient.  When types are ex-
ante affiliated and the affiliation is not too strong, a similar result holds true, but revenue 
equivalence fails.  It turns out that when both auctions have an efficient equilibrium, the 
auction with flexible entry fees performs better in terms of revenue.  In the concluding 
section, we discuss whether the argument also holds true in other auction formats, such as 
a first-price sealed-bid auction, or when interdependencies are positive. 
Another interpretation of the auction with flexible entry fees (where the monetary 
fees are collected by the auctioneer) is that firms burn money or hire expensive auction 
                                                                          
4  The importance of costly signaling to restore auction efficiency is also studied, although in a very 
different context, by Schwarz and Sonin (2005). 
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experts to signal their strength.  As long as the amount of money burnt (the cost of hiring 
auction experts) is either visible or made public, then this will have the same effect as 
flexible entry fees.5  Again, contrary to the common idea that exchanging information is 
bad (as it may lead to collusion)6, making this kind of information public will improve 
the efficiency of the auction.  This signaling resolves the uncertainty firms have about 
each other’s signals.  In this interpretation, however, the revenue collected by the 
auctioneer is lower than in the standard second-price sealed-bid auction, because a part of 
the revenue is either burnt or spent on experts. 
Apart from the above-mentioned literature, the paper is also related to the literature 
on auctions with entry fees.  Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that entry fees may lead to 
problems with the existence of monotonic equilibria, and Landsberger and Tsirelson 
(2000) show that with entry fees or other participation costs, monotonic equilibria 
become increasingly unlikely once the number of bidders is large.  These sources of 
inefficiency do not arise here because entry fees are flexible so that bidders can decide on 
the size of the fee they would like to pay.  Perry et al. (2000) analyze a two stage sealed-
bid auction for a single object where the two highest bidders of the first stage proceed to 
the second stage and all loosing bids are revealed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the basic 
model with negative externalities by means of an example.  In this example, there is one 
object to be auctioned, there are two bidders with private information about their types, 
the types are identically and independently distributed, and the bidders have additively 
separable linear valuation functions with negative interdependencies.  In this basic set-up, 
we show that when the negative interdependency is strong, the auction with flexible entry 
fees, contrary to a second-price sealed-bid auction, always has an efficient equilibrium.  
Moreover, we show that in terms of revenues the two mechanisms are equivalent when 
both have an efficient equilibrium.  In Section 3, we show that these results hold in a 
general setting with independent types.  Section 4 analyzes the case of correlated types 
and Section 5 concludes with a discussion.  The appendix contains all proofs. 
                                                                          
5  Klemperer (2002a) observes that in the mid nineties Pacific Telephone paid for full page ads in 
newspapers and hired one of the most prominent auction theorists to give seminars, signaling that the 
California license was of utmost importance to them. 
6  See, e.g., Grimm et al. (2003) on the role of information provision in facilitating collusion. 
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2. The Basic Model  
As an example, we consider a standard symmetric single-object second-price sealed-bid 
auction, from now on termed the SP-auction, where two bidders, denoted by i , { }2,1, ∈j
ij ≠
iX i
]1,0
( )XF iPr
, have interdependent valuations.  Bidder i’s type and his value for the object are 
denoted by  and V  respectively.  The types of the bidders are identically and 
independently distributed over the interval [  in accordance with a distribution 
function .  The values of the bidders for the object are interdependent 
and given by the following linear valuation function: 
( )x ≡ x≤
( ) cbXaXXXvV jijii +−== , , 
where  and , which ensures that values are positive.  It is easily seen that 
the values are negatively interdependent: a bidder i’s own type affects his value positively 
whereas the type of his competitor has a negative effect on his value.  This negative 
dependence reflects the fact that often in an auction where some after-auction interaction 
(such as after-market competition) takes place, a bidders’ type (such as a measure of his 
cost efficiency) positively affects his own value but negatively inflicts upon the value of 
the competitor.  Moreover, it is easily seen that auction efficiency requires the bidder 
with the highest type to win the auction. 
0>a 0>> bc
We make the usual assumptions of a game with private information, namely that a 
bidder’s type is private information, i.e., bidder i knows the realization  of , the 
other bidder j does not know , but he knows v and F, and all this is common 
knowledge.  Invoking a standard procedure, one can easily verify that 
ix iX
ix
( ) ( ) cxbaxSP +−=β  
constitutes a unique symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the SP-auction provided 
that .  This equilibrium is efficient and ensures that the bidder with the highest 
value makes the highest bid and wins the object.  If, on the other hand, , the 
function  decreases so that the SP-auction does not have a monotone symmetric 
equilibrium.  Therefore, there is a strictly positive probability that in this case the SP-
auction results in an allocation that is inefficient. 
ba >
β
ba ≤
( )xSP
The non-standard feature of the mechanism that we consider is that prior to the 
auction, each bidder decides on an amount  that he voluntarily pays to the seller 0≥ie
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before participating in the auction.  We call this e  a flexible entry fee and it is important 
that this  is public information before the auction takes place so that bidders can update 
their beliefs about their competitor’s type before the auction starts.  We refer to the 
second-price sealed-bid auction with flexible entry fees as the FEF-auction. 
i
ei
The timing of the game is as follows.  In stage one, after nature assigns types to 
bidders, both bidders simultaneously submit payments  to the auctioneer.  These 
payments are publicly observed.  In stage two, the bidders participate in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction where they submit bids 
0≥ie
0≥iβ , and the bidder with the highest bid gets 
the object and pays a price that is equal to the second highest bid, which in the case of 
 is also the lowest bid.  In case of a tie, which will not happen in equilibrium with 
positive probability, an arbitrary tie-breaking rule applies.  Importantly, only the bids 
made during the auction (and not the entry fees paid) determine the allocation of the 
object. 
2=N
We use Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, WPBE hereinafter, as the equilibrium 
concept. 
Definition 1.  A symmetric WPBE of the FEF-auction consists of a strategy and beliefs 
such that: 
a) the strategy of bidder i is a pair of functions, ( )ii xe*=  and ( )jii , where 
( )ii xe=  is the entry fee chosen, and )jii eex ,,  is the bid when ie  and je  are the 
chosen entry fees; 
e
(
i eex ,,
*ββ =
e * *β
b) the belief of bidder i is the conditional probability distribution 
( ) ( )jiiijjii eexXyXeexyB ,,Pr,,* =≤≡  of the competitor’s type jX , conditional on 
ix , ie , and je ; 
c) strategies are optimal given the strategy of the other bidders and beliefs; 
d) beliefs are generated by Bayes’ rule on-the-equilibrium path. 
It is easy to see that  is also an equilibrium of the FEF-auction, i.e., if , then 
, , and naive beliefs 
( )xSPβ
j( )= β SP
ba >
( ) 0* =xe β* x,ei,e x( ) ( ) ( )yFeexyB =,,* ji  on- and off-the-
equilibrium path, constitute a symmetric equilibrium of the FEF-auction.  The reason is 
as follows.  In such a pooling equilibrium, the entry fees that bidders choose are all zero 
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and do not contain information on their types.  Consequently, the bids are solely based on 
a bidder’s own type.  On the other hand, if the bidders anyway do not adjust their bids 
depending on which entry fees are paid, then there is no point in paying a positive entry 
fee.  Note, however, that this equilibrium does not exist if a . b≤
In addition to the pooling equilibrium, there is another symmetric WPBE of the FEF-
auction, which is perfectly separating and which always exists.  In this equilibrium, 
bidders choose positive entry fees in accordance with the following increasing and 
continuously differentiable function:7 
( ) ( ) ( )( ( )xFxzzExbdzzFbxe xFEF <−== 
0
)
}
. (1) 
For convenience, we define its generalized inverse function for non-negative values of e 
as follows: 
( ) ( ){ exexeh FEF ≤= :max . (2) 
In other words, if  then  is the type which pays entry fee e: 
.  If, however,  then  is defined by .  The function 
 represents bidders’ beliefs: 
( )[ ]1,0 FEFee∈
ee >
( )eh
( )( ) eeheFEF =
( )eh
( )1FEF ( )eh ( ) 1=eh
( ) ( )( )

≥
<
=
ehyif
ehyif
eexyB ji
FEF
,1
,0
,, . (3) 
In other words, having observed an entry fee  of bidder j, bidder i believes that bidder j 
is of type 
je
( )jj ehx =  with probability one: 
( )( ) 1Pr === eeehX jj . 
It is easy to see that along the equilibrium path, the belief satisfies Bayes’ rule. 
In the second stage, bidder i bids his value given his belief: 
( ) ( ) cebhaxeex jijiiFEFi +−== ,,ββ . (4) 
We will now argue that (1), (2), (3), and (4) constitute a WPBE.  It is clear that if it is an 
equilibrium, it is efficient as the highest type bidder submits the highest bid and gets the 
object.  Due to full information revelation in the first stage, beliefs are degenerate in the 
second stage, and bidding one’s own valuation is an optimal action in the second-price 
                                                                          
7  In the next Section, we comment on the interpretation of this expression for the entry fee. 
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sealed-bid auction.  Hence, bidders do not have a profitable deviation away from bidding 
. ( )jiiFEF eex ,,β
We now concentrate on the optimality of paying the flexible entry fee specified in 
(1).  If a bidder i of type x sets entry fee , as if he were of type y, then he wins the 
object (neglecting ties) if the type of the other bidder z satisfies 
( )yeFEF
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )yezezzeyex FEFFEFFEFFEFFEFFEF ,,,, ββ > , 
which can be written as  or cbyazcbzax +−>+−
ba
byaxz
+
+
< . 
If this is the case, bidder i wins the object at auction price 
( ) ( )( ) cbyazyezez FEFFEFFEFj +−== ,,ββ , 
and has valuation ( ) cbzaxzxv i +−== β, .  The expected profit of bidder i is therefore 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )

++
+−−+−+−≡
babyax
FEF zdFcbyazcbzaxyeyx
/
0
,π ( )
( )
)
, 
which can be rewritten as follows, by using (1) and integrating by parts: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) (
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
.
,
/
0
/
/
0
/
00
/
00



++++
++++
++
−+−=
−+−+



−−=
+−−+−+−=
babyaxbabyax
y
babyaxbabyaxy
babyaxy
zdFzxazdFzyb
zdFzxazdFzybzdFzyb
zdFcbyazcbzaxdzzFbyxπ
 
Setting the entry fee equal to  is optimal because ( )xeFEF
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0,,
/
/
>−+−=− 
+−+
+−−
bayxay
y
x
bayxbx
zdFyzbzdFzxayxxx ππ  
for all xy ≠
)
(1FEFe
.  Thus, there is no profitable deviation from , which is lower than 
.  Also, choosing a fee above  is strictly suboptimal, given the proposed 
beliefs off-the-equilibrium path.  Indeed, setting any entry fee  induces the 
same belief of bidder j as entry fee : .  Thus, raising the entry fee 
above  neither affects the bid of bidder j (and thus the price to be paid if bidder i 
( )xeFEF
ie
(1FEFe ( )1FEFe
FEF
i ee =
( )1FEFe>
( )1 ( ) 1=ieh
)
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wins), nor the winning probability of bidder i.  It only increases his own expenses and is, 
therefore, strictly suboptimal.  Thus, no bidder has an incentive to deviate from . ( )xeFEF
( )xFEFIn fact, any off-the-equilibrium belief supports the equilibrium strategy  and 
.  Indeed, with any other off-the-equilibrium path beliefs different from 
e
( jiiFEF eex ,,β
FEF
)
B , bidder j puts some positive probability that the deviating bidder i is of type , 
whereas 
1<x
FEFB  puts zero probability on this event.  As a result, the expected value of 
bidder j and, therefore, his bid, is strictly higher than with the equilibrium belief FEFB , 
which assigns  with probability one.  This implies that setting  is even 
less attractive for bidder i if the belief of bidder j differs from 
1=x ( )1FEFi ee >
FEFB .  Therefore, any 
belief supports the strategy  and  as a WPBE. ( )xeFEF ( jiiFEF eex ,,β )
Thus, and this is the main point of the example, the FEF-auction has an efficient 
equilibrium for all values of the parameters a, b and c.  Moreover, the FEF-auction is 
never worse (in terms of efficiency) than the SP-auction and is strictly better for some 
values of the parameters (in particular when  and the SP-auction is inefficient). ba ≤
Interestingly, for the case where  and both the SP-auction and the FEF-auction 
have efficient equilibria, they generate equal revenues.  In the SP-auction, the revenue 
comes solely from bids: 
ba >
{ }( )( ) ( ) { }( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .22
,min,,min
1
0 0
1
0 0
2121
cxdFzdFzbaxdFzdFcbzaz
XXzzzvEXXER
xx
SPSP
+−=+−=
===
  
β
 
In the FEF-auction, to the contrary, a part eFEFR ,  of the revenue comes from collecting 
the entry fees: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  === 1
0 0
1
0
, 222 xdFdzzFbxdFxeXeER
x
FEF
i
FEFeFEF , 
and integrating in parts yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   −== 1
0 0
1
0 0
, 22 xdFzdFzxbxdFdzzFbR
xx
eFEF . 
The remaining part β,FEFR  of the revenue stems from the bids made: 
( ) ( )( ) { } { }( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .2,2
,max,,min,,
1
0 0
1
0 0
2121
,
cxdFzdFbxazxdFzdFxzv
XXxXXzxezezER
xx
FEFFEFFEFFEF
+−==
===
  
ββ
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It can easily be verified that SPFEFeFEF RRR =+ β,, , so that revenue equivalence holds.  
The intuition for this revenue equivalence is that both auctions are efficient, the lowest 
type gets zero expected profit, and types are statistically independent, and, consequently, 
the expressions for revenues in these two auctions are identical. 
The fact that the second highest bidder, i.e., the bidder whose bid is relevant for the 
auction payment, in the FEF-auction shades his bid relative to the bid he would make in 
the SP-auction follows from (4).  Knowing that his competitor has a higher type (as 
( ) ij xeh > ) makes bidder i bidding less ( ) than he would have bid in 
the SP-auction ( ) where he would have bid an amount as if his 
competitor were of the same type . 
( ) cebhax jiFEF +−=β
cbxax ii
SP +−=β
ix
As all bidders have to pay the entry fee they have proposed, it is clear that the winner 
of the auction is better off in the FEF-auction and all non-winners are worse off.  In other 
words, from the perspective of a bidder of a given type, the FEF-auction provides higher 
pay-off in case he wins, and lower pay-off in case he loses, than the SP-auction.  At the 
same time, both auctions yield equal expected surplus to the bidder.  This implies that, 
from the bidders’ perspective, the FEF-auction is riskier than the SP-auction and, 
therefore, with risk-averse bidders, the FEF-auction would raise higher revenue than the 
SP-auction. 
A natural question that arises is why bidders want to pay a positive entry fee.  The 
reason is that, although the entry fee is sunk at the moment of the auction, entry fees 
signal bidders’ types thereby affecting each other’s bids in a desirable way: bids get 
lower when entry fees increase.  By raising the entry fee, a bidder reduces the bid of his 
competitor and, therefore, lowers the price to be paid in case he wins the object. 
We conclude that the FEF-auction yields the same outcome in terms of efficiency 
and revenue as the SP-auction when the latter has an efficient equilibrium, but retains the 
property of efficiency for parameter values where the SP-auction does not have an 
efficient equilibrium. 
3. The General Model with Independent Types 
The example in the previous section was special in a number of ways: the valuation 
function was supposed to be linear in the bidders’ types, the analysis was restricted to two 
bidders and one object, and the types were supposed to be independently distributed.  In 
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this section, we first relax the first two assumptions and show that they are not essential 
to the argument.  The last part of the section analyzes the effect of allowing bidders’ 
types to be correlated.  We will see that in that case the argument can only be extended by 
allowing weak forms of affiliation. 
Consider a standard symmetric multi-unit uniform-price auction where  
bidders with unit demand, denoted by subscript i, compete for  homogeneous 
objects, .  Bidders’ types  are identically and independently distributed over the 
interval  in accordance with a distribution function .  The values of the bidders 
for the objects are interdependent and given by the following valuation function: 
2≥N
1≥n
Nn <
[ ]1,0
iX
( )xF
( )iii XvV −= X, , 
where  is a collection of types of all bidders other than i.  We assume that 
is symmetric in all , differentiable on [ , and  i.e., 
there is a negative externality.
i−X ( )iiXv −X,  
jX∂// ,ijX −∈X ]N1,0 i vXv ∂>>∂∂ 0
8 
In the FEF-auction, bidders simultaneously choose and publicly pay entry fees  
and then simultaneously submit auction bids 
ie
iβ .  The  bidders who have submitted the 
 highest bids get the objects and pay the auction price, which is equal to the highest 
non-winning bid.  We denote the equilibrium bidding function by , 
where  is a collection of entry fees chosen by all bidders other than i, and consider 
symmetric equilibria where  is symmetric in all . 
n
n
( )i−iiFEFi ex= e,,ββ
i−
i−e
( iiiFEF ex −e,,β ) je ∈e
Suppose that a bidder’s type  takes value .  We denote the bidder with the nth 
highest type amongst all  bidders except bidder i by k so that his type is .  
Excluding bidders i and k, we refer to all remaining (  bidders of types  by 
subscript  (they all win the auction and get objects), and we refer to ( ) 
remaining bidders of types  by subscript l  (they all lose the auction).  If  
then , and if  then . 
iX
)
k
L
ix
L∈
( 1−N
j xx <
1+
kx
k
1−
1=n
)
)
                                                                         
1−n j xx >
− nNW∈w
∅=W = nN ∅=
We define a function  as the expected value of a bidder i of type  
conditional on (i) one of his competitors, bidder j, being of type , (ii)  
( zyxv ,,ˆ xxi =
( )1−nyxj =
 
8  In some settings, it is more realistic to assume that values only depend on the types of the winning 
bidders, e.g., when auction winners compete with each other in an after-market.  The analysis tolerates such 
a setting quite easily. 
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bidders  being of type , and (iii)  bidders  being of type 
: 
W∈w
( )
zxw > ( 1−− nN ) L∈l
zxl <
( )( ),, zXz l <
1−n
( )
}je
,, XyXXvE wiii >=−X
)
, Xx j=
l
)( )dGzx,
( )( )i
x= max
,, zyx ≡
)1−
( ) = xFEF x
0
ii
FEF ex ,,
( )i−eh
vˆ
( − nN
e
β
 
where the expectation is taken with respect to (  random variables  and 
 random variables . 
wX
X
The main proposition of this paper demonstrates that the FEF-auction always has an 
efficient, i.e., a perfectly separating, monotone, and symmetric, WPBE. 
Proposition 1.  There exists an efficient WPBE of the FEF-auction, where bidders choose 
an entry fee: 
( ) (− zzvzzzv ,ˆ,,ˆ , 
bid according to 
( ) ii xv −− = ehe , , 
where  consists of , and beliefs are given by ( ) ( ){ FEFj xeeh ≤:
( ) ( )( )
<
j
j
eh
eh
, .
z=
xi

 ≥=ji
FEF
yif
yif
eexy
,1
,0
,B
( zzv ,,ˆ
zzv ,,ˆ
 
In equilibrium, higher types pay a higher entry fee in the first stage.  In the second stage, 
all bidders bid their values.  Proposition 1 shows that all the properties of the unique 
monotone symmetric perfectly separating WPBE presented in the example of Section 2 
continue to hold for an arbitrary valuation function which exhibits a negative externality, 
and for an arbitrary number of objects and bidders.  As in the example, bidders’ beliefs 
off-the-equilibrium path do not play an important role here as any belief supports the 
separating Bayesian equilibrium strategies as WPBE. 
It is interesting to note the interpretation of the entry fee.  Let bidder i have the same 
type as bidder k, i.e., .  Then, the valuation of the latter would have been 
.  Hence, by having value , bidder i imposes a negative externality of size 
 on bidder k by reducing his value by that amount.  This externality 
only realizes when bidder i wins and bidder k does not win, i.e., when 
xx ki =
)
)
z
( )z
x=
( zxzv ,,ˆ−
xz < .  Therefore, 
from bidder i’s perspective, the entry fee  he pays is the expected externality he ( )xeFEF
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imposes on the marginal bidder k.  Thus, flexible entry fees allow bidders to internalize 
the negative externality they impose on each other so that the externality does not affect 
the monotonicity property of bidders’ bids.  Hence, an efficient equilibrium always exists.  
This is the crucial difference between the entry fee chosen by the auctioneer (including 
the case of a voluntary entry fee à la Maskin and Riley, 1981) and flexible entry fees 
chosen by bidders themselves. 
In case  is an increasing function of x, the FEF-auction also has a pooling 
equilibrium that coincides with the equilibrium of the SP-auction, where all bidders 
choose an entry fee of zero and bid their expected valuation in case they are uncertain 
about their competitors’ types, i.e.,  and , and 
beliefs are the prior beliefs 
( xxxv ,,ˆ )
)( ) 0* =xe ( ) ( ) ( xxxvxex SPii ,,ˆ,,* ==− ββ e
( ) (yFej =, )exyB i,*
)
( ) ( )SP
.  Contrary to the separating equilibrium, 
the pooling equilibrium requires specific beliefs off-the-equilibrium path.  The revenue 
generated in the separating equilibrium is equal to the revenue generated in the SP-
auction as revenue equivalence holds.  In case  is not monotonically increasing, 
the SP-auction does not have an efficient equilibrium and, therefore, its outcome is 
inefficient with positive probability.  These results are summarized in the next 
proposition. 
( )xx,xv ,ˆ
Proposition 2.  The SP-auction has an efficient equilibrium if and only if  is an 
increasing function of x, in which case .  If an efficient equilibrium 
exists, it raises the same expected revenue as the separating equilibrium of the FEF-
auction. 
( xxxv ,,ˆ
xxxvx ,,ˆ=β
This Section has considered second-price sealed-bid auctions (and auctions that are 
strategically equivalent) and one may wonder what the results may be if a first-price 
sealed-bid auction is considered.  It is easy to see that a perfectly revealing equilibrium 
never exists in a first-price sealed-bid auction with negative externalities.  This can best 
be seen in the two bidder’s case.  If such an equilibrium had existed, the bidder with the 
highest type would have bid marginally higher than the other bidder who, in turn, would 
have bid his true value.  This outcome is, however, prone to the following deviation.  By 
setting his entry fee equal to zero, bidder one ensures that the other bidder believes in 
winning the auction.  As a result, bidder two will bid not his own value but the value of 
the first bidder conditional on his type being zero, which is lower.  Hence, by setting his 
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entry fee equal to zero, bidder one lowers the bid function of bidder two and wins the 
object with certainty.  Besides, he saves on the entry fee.  This makes the deviation 
profitable, and the corresponding separating equilibrium fails to exist.  Thus, the second-
price principle is crucial to obtain the separating result we emphasize in this paper. 
4. Correlated Types 
We now generalize our example of Section 2 to an environment where bidders’ types are 
positively correlated, provided the correlation is not too strong.  It is clear that positive 
correlation of types reinforces the negative externality so that an efficient equilibrium of 
the SP-auction is even less likely to exist (see also, e.g., Janssen and Karamychev, 
2009b).  The reason is as follows.  A first effect of a bidder’s type is that a high type 
bidder has a higher value than a low type bidder, for the same fixed types of their 
competitors.  This first, direct effect is positive.  However, due to positive correlation, a 
high type bidder expects competitors to be of higher types than a low type bidder expects 
them to be.  This creates a second, indirect effect, on the value, which is negative.  When 
the correlation is strong, the second effect dominates the first one so that the ex-ante 
expected value of a bidder conditional on winning is not a monotonically increasing 
function of his type.  Consequently, as his bid in the SP-auction is his expected value, a 
monotone bidding equilibrium fails to exist. 
In our model where signaling is allowed, if bidders’ types are strongly correlated 
bidders do not have an incentive to signal their types by paying a (high) entry fee as the 
other bidders can anyway infer someone’s type once they have observed their own type.  
Therefore, an efficient equilibrium of the FEF-auction only exists if the correlation is not 
too strong. 
To study the effects of correlation we consider for simplicity the two-bidder setting 
of Section 2.  Suppose bidders’ types are weakly affiliated and the distribution function of 
 conditional on  is jX xX i = ( ) ( xXzXxzF ij =≤≡ Pr ) , the density is ( xzf ) , and 
( ) ( ) 0≤/ ∂∂≡ xxzFxzFx , i.e., there is affiliation.  Let the value function be 
( ) cj +bXaXX iji −=,Xv .  We consider situations where 
( ) 


+
+≥ x
ba
byaxFyyF  for xy > , and ( ) 


+
+≤ x
ba
byaxFyyF  for xy < , (5) 
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for all .  When types are independent, condition [ 1,0, ∈yx
iX
] (5) is always satisfied.  When 
 and  are affiliated and jX xy > , the distribution ( yF  )  stochastically dominates 
( )xF   so that ( ) ( )xyFyy <F .  Hence, (5) is only satisfied when the affiliation is 
weak.  On the other hand, for a given distribution with affiliation, (5) is never satisfied for 
, which corresponds to the limiting case of an externality that is extremely strong.  
Hence, 
0=a
(5) assumes both a relatively weak affiliation of types and a weak externality. 
The following proposition shows that condition (5) guarantees the existence of an 
efficient WPBE of the FEF-auction. 
Proposition 3.  Consider the case where  and the value function is linear and 
given by 
2=N
( ) cbXaXXXv +−=,
( )FEF
jiji
( )xeFEF
.  If (5) holds (sufficient condition), then the strategy 
consisting of an entry fee  and bids  with jii eex ,,i ββ =
( ) ( )=
x
FEF dzzzFbxe
0
FEF and , ( ) ( ) cebhaxeex jijii +−=,,β
where  and beliefs ( ) ( ){ }jFEFj exexeh ≤= :max
( ) ( )( )
 ≥
<
=
j
j
ji
FEF
ehyif
ehyif
eexyB
,1
,0
,, , 
constitute an efficient WPBE of the FEF-auction. 
This WPBE only exists if (necessary condition) 
( ) ( ) 0≥+
+
xxFxxf
ba
a
x . 
The argument made in the proof of Proposition 3 is similar to the one made in Section 2 
and replaces the unconditional distribution function used there by the conditional 
distribution function and then shows that the argument can be extended by allowing weak 
forms of affiliation of the type that satisfies (5). 
In equilibrium, bidders bid their values in the second stage.  In the first stage, they 
pay entry fees that are increasing in types.  Condition (5) guarantees that there is no 
profitable deviation from , i.e., it is essentially a (global) sufficient second-order 
condition that ensures that further deviations are even less profitable than smaller 
deviations.  The necessary (local) second-order condition for the FEF-auction to have an 
( )xeFEF
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efficient equilibrium can be obtained from (5) by taking a limit when x and y converge to 
each other. 
In accordance with Proposition 3, the FEF-auction does not have an efficient 
separating equilibrium when the correlation and the externality are strong.  Nevertheless, 
the FEF-auction can have an efficient pooling equilibrium, which is an efficient 
equilibrium of the SP-auction if it exists.  Thus, the FEF-auction is at least as efficient as 
the SP-auction, and sometimes it is strictly more efficient. 
In the case of affiliation, we may also wonder how revenues under the efficient 
equilibrium of the SP-auction and the efficient equilibrium of the FEF-auction compare.  
To make the comparison useful, we have to consider situations where both equilibria 
exist, and therefore we restrict the analysis to the case where (5) holds and, in addition, 
 so that the SP-auction has an efficient equilibrium.  It is straightforward to show 
that the efficient equilibrium of the SP-auction is given by .  
The next proposition shows that the FEF-auction generates larger revenues than the SP-
auction. 
ba >
( ) ( ) ( ) cxbaxxvxSP +−== ,β
Proposition 4.  Consider the case where  and the value function is linear and 
given  by 
2=N
( ) cbXaXXXv +−=, a > X
are strong enough, auctions may not yield an efficient allocation of the object(s).  We 
jiji , ,  and  are affiliated, and b iX j (5) holds.  
Then, revenue in the FEF-auction is strictly higher than in the SP-auction. 
In the FEF-auction, the revenue does not only come from the winning bid and the entry 
fee paid by the winning bidder, but also from the entry fees paid by all other bidders.  
Therefore, the Linkage (Revenue Ranking) Principle (cf. Krishna, 2002, p. 103) cannot be 
applied, and the revenue has to be computed and compared with the revenue in the SP-
auction directly.  It turns out that the FEF-auction better exploits the correlation of 
bidders’ types from the perspective of the auctioneer and results in a higher revenue. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that by allowing bidders to make flexible, publicly 
observable payments before they enter an auction, the negative externalities, which have 
played an important role in the recent literature on auctions with post-auction 
interactions, can be mitigated.  The literature has stressed that if the negative externalities 
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have argued that asking for a flexible entry fee restores efficiency, and in case of 
affiliated types brings about a higher revenue.  Important to note here is that this 
argument can be generalized to settings with asymmetric bidders, e.g., to bidders with 
different valuation functions and different distributions of bidders’ types.  The reason is 
that in a separating equilibrium bidders just bid their true values irrespective of whether 
there are asymmetries between them or not. 
We have made the argument in this paper by considering negative externalities.  It is 
easy
he auction itself is efficient, the efficiency of the 
auct
 to see that a perfectly revealing equilibrium never exists in a second-price sealed-bid 
auction with positive externalities.  The reason bidders are willing to pay an entry fee in a 
setting where externalities are negative is that this has a negative impact on the expected 
valuation of the other bidders, hence on their bids, and thereby on the price that bidders 
have to pay for the object in case they win the auction.  Under positive externalities, to 
the contrary, bidders are willing to signal that their types are the lowest possible types as 
this has a negative impact on the expected valuation of the other bidders, hence on their 
bids, and thereby on the price that bidders have to pay for the object in case they win the 
auction.  Consequently, if the externality is positive only pooling equilibria exist, in 
which bidders do not pay an entry fee and then play the standard second-price sealed-bid 
auction.  The type of applications that motivate this paper, however, like auctions with 
Cournot and Bertrand type of competition in the downstream market are all examples 
where negative externalities are present. 
In summary, we have shown that if t
ion will not be affected by the introduction of flexible entry fees.  If the auction is, to 
the contrary, inefficient, then the introduction of flexible entry fees restores the efficiency 
of the auction by allowing bidders to signal their type prior to the auction. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
First, it is easy to see that e  is a strictly increasing function so that the proposed 
WPBE is perfectly separating: 
( )xFEF
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,ˆ,,ˆ
00
>


∂
∂
−=


−= 
xx
FEF zdGzxz
y
vzdGzxzv
dx
dxe
dx
d  
due to  as being the conditional expectation of . 0/ˆ <∂∂ yv 0/ <∂∂ jXv
Suppose all bidders except bidder i have beliefs FEFB  and follow the proposed 
WPBE strategy.  In this case, each bidder j sets entry fee  and, 
therefore, bidder i correctly infers the type of all other bidders on-the-equilibrium path by 
using the inverse function 
( ) ( )1FEFjFEFj exe ≤=e
( ) jj xeh =
))
( ))
)
.  Irrespective of the chosen entry fee , bidding his 
exact value  in the second stage is optimal for bidder i, just like in the SP-
auction.  Thus, bidder i has no profitable deviation from bidding 
.  In the rest of the proof, we show that bidders do not benefit 
by deviating from  for the proposed on- and off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. 
ie
(( iii xvv −= eh,
( ) ( ii xv −− = ehe ,
(xeFEF
ii
FEF ex ,,β
For notational convenience, we will write the collection of types other than  as 
 referring to the type of a given bidder k.  By 
iX
( ikki x −− = XX , ) ( )F −xˆ  denote the joint 
distribution function of ik−X  conditional on w zX >  other winning bidders 
W∈w  and losing bidders L∈l . sing this notation, ( )vˆ an be written as 
follows: 
zik  we
for all
  U  c
lX>  
zyx ,,
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
 ∏
<<
−
−
−
==
<>
≠
≠
−
=
==<>
=
wl
ki
lw
XzX
ik
n
ik
kilw
yXxX
zXzX
kj
ij jii
zFdyxv
yXxXzXzX
xdFXv
zyxv xX
X
ˆ,,
,,Pr
,
,,ˆ 2,
,
. 
Suppose bidder i of type x sets entry fee  as if he were of type , 
and all other bidders j follow the equilibrium strategy.  Bidder i wins and gets the object 
if and only if his bid 
( )yee FEFi = [ ]1,0∈y
iβ  is higher than bid kβ  of bidder k.  Denoting  and taking 
into account that 
zxk =
(( )ikzxv −X,, )i =β  and ((k yzv= ,, ))ik−Xβ , we write ki ββ >  as 
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( )( ) (( ikik yzvzxv −− > XX ,,,, )).  If this is indeed the case, bidder i pays the auction price kβ  
and gets surplus 
( ) kiikzyxs − −≡X,,, ( )( ) (( )ikik yzvzxv −− −= XX ,,,, )ββ . 
If this is not the case, bidder i does not get the object.  The expected surplus  of 
bidder i conditional on winning is 
( yxs ,ˆ )
( ) ( ) ( )( )0,,,,,,,ˆ ≡
−ikzyxsEyxs X
( ) ( ) syeyx FEF Pr, +−≡π
( ), <yxy
>
−ikzyxs X
( )
, 
where the expectation is taken with respect to z and .  Bidder i’s ex-ante surplus is, 
therefore, 
ik−X
( )( ) yxszyx ik ,ˆ0,,, ⋅>−X . 
We will show that 0π  for all xy >  and ( ) 0, >yxyπ  for all xy < , which implies 
that ( )yx,π  attains its unique global maximum w.r.t. y at xy = . 
First, we note that xz
ik−X
<
z
 is equivalent to or any 
realization of .  This is so because the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in x and 
equals the left-hand side at 
( )( ) (( ikik xzvzzv −− > XX ,,, )),  f
= .  This allows us to rewrite  as follows: ( )xeFEFx
( ) ( ) −= xFEF vzzzvxe
0
ˆ,,ˆ
( ) (
( )( ) ( ) ( ) (( )
( )( ) ( )( )

−−
>
−=
ikik xzvzzv
zdGzxzvzzzvzdGzxz
XX :,:,
,,ˆ,,ˆ,, ) ( ) . 
Next, we write 
)( ) ( )
<<
−
=
wl XzX
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−
ik
n
ik zFd xˆ
2 , 
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)( ) ( )
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=
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xzvzxzv X,,,,ˆ
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−
−
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ik zFd xˆ
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Hence, 
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In a similar fashion, we rewrite ( )yx,π : 
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Under our assumptions on functions v and F, ( yx, )π  is differentiable.  By taking the 
partial derivative of ( yx, )π  w.r.t. y, we have to consider variations of the integrands and 
of the domains of integration, i.e., variations of the sets of the values of z and  where 
 and .  Due to the continuity of  all 
variations of domains happen at  and do not contribute to 
ik−X
ikz −X,( 0,,, >−ikzyzs x ) )( 0,, >−ikz x
0=s
, yxs ( )yxs ,, ,
)( yxy ,π .  Thus, 
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Next, using the definition of  and writing  yields: ( ikzyxs −X,,, ) kk Xvv ∂∂≡ /
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Then, using the following chain of the equivalence relations: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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we rewrite ( yxy , )π  as follows 
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Suppose now that xy > .  This implies  so that we can 
rewrite 
( )( ) (( ikik zxvzyv −− > XX ,,,, ))
)( yxy ,π  as follows: 
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The first and the last terms cancel each other out, so that 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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The last inequality follows from  and from the fact that the domain of integration is 
never empty.  Indeed, for 
0<kv
xyz = > : 
( )( ) ( )( ) (( )ikikik zxvyzvzyv −−− >= xxx ,,,,,, ,)
)
 
and for z marginally lower than y: 
( )( ) (( )ikik yzvzyv −− > xx ,,,, . 
Hence, ( ) 0, <yxyπ  and, therefore, ( ) ( xxyx ,, )ππ <  for all xy > .  Thus, choosing xy >  
is not a profitable deviation. 
Similarly, xy <  implies  so that we rewrite ( )( ) (( ikik zxvzyv −− < XX ,,,, )) )( yxy ,π  as 
follows: 
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which yields: 
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Hence, neither xy <  is a profitable deviation. 
On the other hand, setting fee  above  is strictly suboptimal for the given 
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs as it affects neither the bid of the other bidders, nor the 
winning probability of bidder i, nor the auction price bidder i pays if he wins.  It only 
ie ( )1FEFe
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increases expenses and, therefore, is strictly suboptimal.  Thus, no bidder has incentives 
to deviate from equilibrium fee . ■ ( )xeFEF
β
( )( ) (zdGz
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Let bidder i of type  bid  in the SP-auction, where  is a 
monotonically increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding function.  Then, bidder i has 
expected value  and wins if and only if he outbids the bid  of bidder k 
with type .  The expected profit of bidder i is, therefore, 
xXi = ( )ySP ( )xSPβ
( zzxv ,,ˆ (zSPβ
X k =
)
)
SP
)
z
( ) ( ) ) −= zzxvyx
0
,,ˆ, βπ
y
. 
Maximizing ( yx,π  w.r.t. y yields the necessary first-order condition: 
( ) ( )yyxvySP ,,ˆ=β , 
which must hold for xy = .  Thus, if such an equilibrium does exist, it must be 
. ( ) ( )xxxvxSP ,,ˆ=β
Suppose now that all bidders follow .  Then ( ) ( )xxxvxSP ,,ˆ=β
( ) ( ) ( −=
y
zzvzzxvyx
0
,ˆ,,ˆ,π )( )dGzz, ( ) . 
It can be easily seen that xy =  is a global maximum of ( yx, )π  w.r.t. y because 
( ) ( ) ( 0,ˆ,,ˆ, <−= yvyyxvyxy )( ), ygyy ( )π  
for xy >  and ( ) 0, >yxyπ  for xy < .  Hence,  is a unique 
monotonically increasing symmetric equilibrium, provided  monotonically 
increases in x. 
( ) ( )xxxvxSP ,,ˆ=β
( xxxv ,,ˆ )
The revenue raised in the SP-auction can be written as follows: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).
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In the FEF-auction, a part eFEFR ,  of the revenue comes from collecting the entry fees: 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) (  −=⋅= 1
0 0
, ,,ˆ,,ˆ xdFzdGzxzvzzzvNXeENR
x
i
FEFeFEF ) ( ) . 
The remaining part β,FEFR  of the revenue stems from the bids made: 
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As SPFEFeFEF RRR =+ β,, , revenue equivalence holds. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
First, it is easy to check that e  strictly increases: ( )xFEF
( ) ( ) 0>= xxbFxe
dx
d FEF
}
. 
This implies that  is a proper inverse function, which leads to 
the Bayesian beliefs 
( ) ( ){ exexeh FEF ≤= :max
( )
j
FEF exB  on-the-equilibrium path. 
Second, bidding one’s own valuation is optimal given beliefs.  In the rest of the 
proof, we show that bidders do not benefit by deviating from  for the proposed 
on- and off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. 
( )xeFEF
If bidder i of type x sets entry fee , his expected profit ( )yeFEF ( yx, )π  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
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Hence, if ( ) ( xxyx ,, )ππ ≤
( )yx,
 for all y bidder i has no incentives to deviate from .  
Differentiating 
( )xeFEF
π  w.r.t. y yields: 
( ) ( ) 






+
+
−−= x
ba
byaxFyyFbyxy ,π . 
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Under the assumption of the proposition, ( ) 0, ≤yxyπ  for xy >  and ( ) 0, ≥yxyπ  for 
xy ≤ , so that xy =
e
 is a global maximum.  Hence, there are no profitable deviations 
from  below .  For deviations above , the same argument as in the 
proof of 
( )xFEFe ( )1FEF ( )1FEFe
Proposition 1 applies. 
In order to derive the necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist we note that the 
global maximum xy =  of ( yx, )π  w.r.t. y must necessarily be a local maximum.  The 
second-order condition for the local maximum is ( ) 0,, ≤xxyyπ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, ≤


+
−−= xxf
ba
bxxF
dx
dbxxyyπ , 
and the necessary condition of Proposition 3 follows. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Expected payment  of bidder i of type x in the SP-auction is: ( )xM SP
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
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. 
His expected payment in the FEF-auction is: 
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The difference  is ( ) ( )xMxM SPFEF −
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0
0
>−=− xSPFEF dzxzGzzGbxMxM  
for all  because, due to affiliation, 0>x ( ) ( xzGzzG > ) for all xz < .  Therefore, the ex-
ante payment of any bidder, hence the auction revenue as well, is strictly higher in the 
FEF-auction than in the SP-auction. ■ 
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